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Abstract— In [1], Shim describes “unknown key-share” attacks
on the two protocols, server-specific MAKEP and linear MAKEP,
proposed by Wong and Chan in [2]. In this letter we point out an
error in one of the attacks and demonstrate further undesirable
properties in the protocols of Wong and Chan.
Index Terms— Mutual authentication, key exchange.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN [2], Wong and Chan proposed two mutual authenticationand key exchange protocols (MAKEPs), namely server-
specific MAKEP and linear MAKEP. They are designed to
be used for establishing secure communications between a
low-power wireless device (client) and a powerful base station
(server).
In [1], Shim described “unknown key-share” attacks on the
two protocols. An unknown key-share attack on an authenti-
cated key agreement protocol is an attack whereby an entity
A ends up believing it shares a key with an entity B, and
although this is in fact the case, B mistakenly believes the key
is instead shared with another entity E 6= A. Here we point
out that, while the attack on server-specific MAKEP works,
the attack on linear MAKEP does not achieve the goals of an
unknown key-share attack. In addition, we will demonstrate
further limitations of the two protocols. Specifically, server-
specific MAKEP allows the choice of the session key to
be entirely under the control of the server, while in linear
MAKEP, the authentication of the client to the server and the
security of the public key scheme may be compromised in
certain implementations.
II. THE PROTOCOLS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
A. Server-specific MAKEP
This protocol eliminates the use of public-key cryptographic
operations at the client side and replaces them with symmetric
key operations. Before running the protocol with a server B,
the client A first obtains a certificate from a trusted authority
TA:
CertB
A
= hID
A
; E
PK
B
(K
A
); Sig
TA
(ID
A
; E
PK
B
(K
A
))i;
where K
A
is A’s long-live symmetric key. Inside the
certificate K
A
is encrypted under B’s public key. It is assumed
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that A and TA have authentic copies of PK
B
. The protocol
actions are as follows, with r
A
, r
B
representing nonces chosen
by A and B respectively:
1. A! B: E
K
A
(r
A
), CertB
A
2. B ! A: E
K
A
(r
A
; r
B
; ID
B
)
3. A! B: E
K
A
(r
B
)
The session key is computed to be  = r
A
 r
B
, which
includes contributions from both party with the aim that no
single party has full control over the selection of the session
key.
However, this aim is not achieved: the server B can always
ensure that the session key is its choice , by putting r
B
=
  r
A
.
It was pointed out in [1] that this protocol is susceptible
to an unknown key-share attack, if an attacker E is able to
obtain the certificate
CertB
E
= hID
E
; E
PK
B
(K
A
); Sig
TA
(ID
E
; E
PK
B
(K
A
))i:
We refer the reader to [1] for details. It was also pointed out
in the same paper that by including ID
A
in the encrypted
message in step 2, this attack can be prevented. We note,
however, that in this improved protocol, the selection of the
session key is still completely under the control of the server
B. This problem can be avoided by replacing E
K
A
(r
A
) in the
first message by h(r
A
) where h is a one-way hash function,
replacing r
A
in the second message by h(r
A
), and including
r
A
in the encrypted message of the last step.
B. Linear MAKEP
This protocol is designed to allow each client to commu-
nicate with as many servers as it wants without inducing
any scalability problems, and also to prevent any server
impersonating its own clients.
Let p be a prime such that the discrete logarithm problem in
Z
p
is intractable. Let g 2 Z
p
be a primitive element. The client
A randomly chooses a sequence of 2n integers a
1
; a
2
; : : : ; a
2n
in Z
p 1
as its secret keys. The corresponding sequence of
public keys is ga1 ; ga2 ; : : : ; ga2n in Z
p
. For each pair of public
keys (ga2i 1 ; ga2i), 1  i  n, a certificate is obtained from
the TA:
Certi
A
= hID
A
; g
a
2i 1
; g
a
2i
; Sig
TA
(ID
A
; g
a
2i 1
; g
a
2i
)i:
The actions of the i-th run of linear MAKEP are as follows,
again with r
A
, r
B
representing nonces chosen by A and B
respectively from Z
p 1
. The session key  is computed to be
r
A
 y.
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1. A! B: Certi
A
2. B ! A: r
B
3. A! B: x = E
PK
B
(r
A
),
y = a
2i 1
(x r
B
) + a
2i
mod (p  1)
4. B ! A: E

(x)
Note that when B receives x and y in step 3, B determines
whether
(g
a
2i 1
)
xr
B
g
a
2i
?
 g
y
(mod p) (1)
before proceeding to decrypt x to obtain r
A
.
The unknown key-share attack described in [1] involves the
attacker E obtaining
Certi
E
= hID
E
; (g
a
2i 1
)

; (g
a
2i
)

;
Sig
TA
(ID
E
; (g
a
2i 1
)

; (g
a
2i
)

)i
where  2 Z
p 1
, from A’s public keys.
When A initiates linear MAKEP and sends Certi
A
to B,
E intercepts and replaces it with Certi
E
. When B sends r
B
to E in reply, E forwards it to A who computes x using
B’s public key, computes y, and sends x, y to B. Again, E
intercepts x, y and sends x, y0 = y to B. Now, B verifies
that x and y0 are correct according to Certi
E
and Equation
(1). If so B computes session key  = r
A
 y
0 and sends
E

(x) to E, which E forwards to A. At this point however,
the attack fails. This is because the last message A expects is
E
r
A
y
(x), not E
r
A
y
0
(x), which E cannot construct. Hence
this “attack” described in [1] does not achieve the goals of an
unknown key-share attack.
However, there are some more serious weaknesses of this
protocol.
Firstly, the authentication of A to B relies on the asym-
metric encryption method having certain properties that are
not stated in [2], that is, a randomly chosen value should not
decipher correctly. Consider the following attack, where E
has observed a successful run of the protocol and wishes to
impersonate A to B. If E, pretending to be A, sends the old
certificate to B, B will respond with a new nonce r0
B
. Now
E lets x0 = x  r
B
 r
0
B
, where x and r
B
are the values
from the intercepted run of the protocol, and sends (x0; y)
to B. As specified in the protocol, B determines whether
x
0 and y match using Equation (1). This will hold since
x
0
 r
0
B
= x  r
B
. Thus B will now decrypt x0. In most
cases this will fail, but, for example, if RSA was used naively
then it will work, and B will believe it is communicating
with A. This is an instance of a successful unknown key-
share attack: E succeeds in misleading B, without necessarily
obtaining the session key. As pointed out by Shim in [1], such
an attack will be detected if key confirmation is performed.
Otherwise the protocol should include a requirement on the
encryption function and also a test by B as to whether x0
decrypts correctly – only after this can B be sure that it is
communicating with A.
Another weakness in the protocol is the use of the secrets
a
2i 1
and a
2i
in a linear equation for computing y, without
hiding the coefficient x r
B
.
It is not quite clear how these pairs of “public keys” are
used, but if they are used more than once then an eavesdropper
E can simply obtain (r
B
; x; y) in the first run, (r0
B
; x
0
; y
0
) in
a subsequent run, compute (y   y0)=(x  r
B
  x
0
 r
0
B
) to
get a
2i 1
, and then get a
2i
. After that E can impersonate
A to any other servers. A straightforward inclusion of r
A
in
the third message (using x r
A
 r
B
instead of x r
B
in y)
would prevent an eavesdropper from launching such an attack,
but would still allow the server B to impersonate its client
A. Hence treating the secret keys associated with Certi
A
as
long-term reusable secrets leads to a breach in security. This
is a serious vulnerability, since some devices may be prone
to “reset” attacks, where counters can be reset after a power
failure, or some implementations may reuse certificates and
keys due to the expensive overhead of updating the limited
storage of key-signature sets. To prevent this, either servers
will have to check with each other that Certi
A
is never reused,
which seems infeasible, or A should delete the private keys
as soon as they have been used. It would appear, then, that
a secure implementation of linear MAKEP, while efficient in
terms of computation, would incur a significant overhead in
communication load, thereby potentially making it impractical.
III. CONCLUSION
In this letter we have pointed out an error in the attack
proposed by Shim in [1] on one of Wong and Chan’s MAKEPs
([2]). We have also shown further limitations of these protocols
and suggested improvements.
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